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AUTHORS’ FINAL VERSION ONLY 
 
“INVOLVING INTERFACE”: AN EXTENDED MIND THEORETICAL 
APPROACH TO ROBOETHICS 
 
Miranda Anderson (University of Edinburgh), Hiroshi Ishiguro (Department of Systems 
Innovation, Osaka University & ATR Intelligent Robotics and Communication 
Laboratories) & Tamami Fukushi (Research Institute for Science and Technology for 
Society, Japan Science and Technology Agency) 
 
In 2008 the authors held “Involving Interface” a lively interdisciplinary event focusing on issues 
of biological, sociocultural and technological interfacing (see acknowledgments). Inspired by 
discussions at this event, in this paper we further discuss the value of input from neuroscience for 
developing robots and machine interfaces, and the value of  philosophy, the humanities and the 
arts for identifying persistent links between human interfacing and broader ethical concerns. The 
importance of ongoing interdisciplinary debate and public communication on scientific and 
technical advances is also highlighted. Throughout the authors explore the implications of the 
extended mind hypothesis for notions of moral accountability and robotics.  
 
Keywords: extended mind; ethics; robotics; interface; interdisciplinary; moral accountability; 
mirror neurons; neuroscience; public communication.  
 
The purpose of “Involving Interface” was the wider dissemination and encouragement of 
exchanges between disciplines, especially in order to keep interactive ongoing debates about the 
history and evolution of biological, technological, and sociocultural interfacing, and to consider 
the wide-ranging ethical implications. The founding premise of this event is also the basis of this 
paper: the notion that sociocultural, technological and physical factors in combination constrain 
and enable human cognitive capacities, including notions of morality. Therefore an extended mind 
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 2 
approach is suggested here as important to considerations of moral accountability, both in general 
and specifically in relation to robotics. An extended mind approach emphasizes the meshing of a 
mass of interactive factors in making up cognitive (and moral) agents and is linked to notions of 
hybridity and diversity. The authors believe that a foundational implication of an extended 
approach is that robotic entities should not just be confined to current or human-like forms of 
morality as a goal. Firstly, perceptions of morality contain elements that vary, as well as those that 
persist, over geographical and temporal spans. Secondly, given the increasingly diverse array of 
types and complexities of robots (as of life forms), and of their intended purposes and 
environments, different forms of moral code will for that reason need to be developed and 
implemented, whether based on type-specific models or on a general model which can then be 
accordingly adapted. Lastly, while in the distant future “roboethics” may need to address more 
urgently the legal issues of robots’ rights and research guidelines on experimentation on robots, 
already this approach invites discussion of how robots and machine interfaces are poised to reflect 
and interact with the creating of ethical categories and concepts of accountability.  
Diverse notions of accountability underlie the funding, performance, and presentation of 
research through its interfacing with public, institutional and commercial domains. Rather than 
focusing on particular disciplinary methodologies, this paper tackles broader issues of 
accountability in relation to changing definitions of human and biological nature as plastic and 
extendable into the world. These changing definitions make a case for more communication over 
research in different fields on the interconnected factors that make up living beings and, the 
authors suggest, implies the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the issue of roboethics. 
Interdisciplinary debates invite us to imagine the variety and complexity of roles robots could play 
in our world.  Multiple perspectives, which can be illuminated both through theoretical arguments 
and through practical experimentation, are necessary in the processes of understanding our selves, 
our world and our robots. Artistic creativity also allows less restricted forms of thinking to emerge 
on these topics. For example, the artist Stelarc through his use and incorporation of prosthetic 
devices has done much to challenge traditional notions of body boundaries, establishing a concept 
of authenticity as relating not to coherency or individuality, but to the ability to collaborate and to 
connect (2005).  
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 The remainder of this paper considers a few of the broader theoretical implications of an 
extended mind approach for ethical robotic systems, through taking into account the relation of 
neuroscience to robotics, and the contributions of literature, interdisciplinary relations and public 
communication. 
 
An Extended Mind Approach  
 
The hypothesis that the mind is extended into the world is becoming increasingly influential 
(Hutchins, 1995; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 1997, 2003, 2008b). The authors presume that 
both the “mind” and “subject” are metaphorical concepts: they therefore extend more fluidly into 
the world than the biological brain or body structure, which contribute to their conceptual capacity. 
The mind cannot be literally described: even those who would reduce it to the biological brain are 
hampered by the current incompleteness of knowledge of its physical nature, and there is a 
manifest difference in scale between neural activity and the capacities of the mind. Therefore 
analysis of the mind should take into account not only the findings of current neuroscience but also 
the metaphors that shape and are shaped by the biological nature of the brain, language, and 
sociocultural and technological trends, both for the ways these metaphors are helpful and for the 
ways they may lead us astray. Similarly, the subject is not reducible to the biological organism, 
although its body is a participating factor in its formation. Scientific terms and cultural and literary 
history are already implicated in each other. This holds implications for how one conceives of 
ethics generally, and of roboethics specifically, inviting input from across the range of academic 
disciplines and creative art forms.  
As well as forms of extendedness that relate just to cognitive processes, it is worth 
considering the more general use of other people, language, objects and robots as an extension of 
the subject, called here “extended subjectivity”, and the various ways in which such extendedness 
can be a recursive means to self-knowledge via an “extended reflexivity” (Anderson, 2007a). 
Stelarc only makes visible by taking one step further the extent to which all human minds and 
subjects loop out into other subjects, the environment and technologies. Intimate forms of 
technological, sociocultural and linguistic interfacing are so habitual they are often invisible to us; 
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 4 
right now “our” words on the page are resounding in your mind, leaving the permeability of 
boundaries revealed by their fluidly intersubjective operation, between people, and intrasubjective 
operation, within a person. Experiencing the breakdown of a laptop or the loss of a friend quickly 
reminds us just how fundamentally distributed we are. Stephen Kosslyn defines as “social 
prosthetic systems” (SPSs) people that we “rely on to extend our reasoning abilities and to help us 
regulate and constructively employ our emotions”; he suggests that we have evolved these social 
systems for the same reason that Clark explains that we employ bodily and technological 
resources: because our brains are limited. (Kosslyn, 2005, 2006; Clark, 2003).  
The biological body structure is also limited but the subject can experience non-biological 
resources as part of the body itself. One of the authors, Hiroshi Ishiguro, experiences an extended 
body image via his robotic interface Geminoid, which suggests that work being done on the haptic 
sense and on the teletransportation of self-perspective may find interesting ways of expanding its 
research through collaborations with roboticists  (Ishiguro, 2005; Ehrrson, 2008; Berti and 
Frassinetti, 2000; Maravati and Iriki, 2004; Tsakiris, 2008). More generally, robots, and especially 
androids or humanoids, can act like mirrors: by figuring a representation of living forms, they are 
potentially revelatory of the working of our interior and social worlds. They are neither entirely 
subject nor entirely object, and this raises questions and tensions about our own liminality and 
heteronomy (Anderson, 2007b). Historical displacements onto women, other nationalities, the 
emotions, and the body as a means of purging and shoring up the leaky walls of human 
subjectivity now find in the cyborg a spectre that appears to threaten humans’ constitutive 
supremacy by its reflection of our own inherent hybridity, which results in our fear and fascination 
over other liminal forms. Yet, transformability is part of our natural inheritance, descended 
together with technologies, from our evolutionary past. The pertinence of this debate is heightened 
by robotics, microprocessing, nanotechnological, biotechnological and genetic engineering 
advances (Gillet, 2007; Ross, 2006; Landecker, 2005). These advances result in our increasing 
ability to add to or manipulate both our biological and non-biological resources. New technologies 
require and create new categories and concepts, as well as transforming those we apply to 
ourselves and other life forms (Turkle, 2004).  
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 5 
Yet, most research in orthodox cognitive science remains “recognizably Cartesian in 
character”: while Cartesian substance dualism has been widely rejected, Cartesian psychology 
continues to shape work in cognitive science in terms of a number of principles, including an 
“explanatory dualism” that posits “a divide between mind and the rest of nature” (Wheeler, 2005). 
The extended mind hypothesis holds potential consequences for all sectors of society: “This is a 
confrontation long overdue, and it is one with implications for our science, morals, education, law, 
and social policy” (Clark 2003). However, Clark does not appear to tackle the question of how his 
rejection of the traditional “executive self” in favour of a coalition “soft self” can be made 
responsible within society other than his implicit trust in the value of acknowledging this as the 
true make up of the human subject. In response to Alice Juarrero’s questioning of “how 
responsible agency is to be fleshed out” (Juarrero 2004), once it is allowed that it is “tools all the 
way down”, Clark suggests he as yet does “not have a good answer” (2004).  
Yet, as Clark has argued in the past, ethical theory tends to concern itself with the individual 
in relation to society, reminding us that “moral reason involves crucial collaborative, interpersonal 
dimensions” (1996). In emphasizing that linguistic principles are part of the mechanism of moral 
reason rather than just imperfect mirrors of moral knowledge, Clark warns that: “Oversimplified 
connectionist models of moral cognition, by marginalizing the collaborative dimensions of moral 
action, likewise threaten to isolate the moral agent from her proper home, the moral community” 
(1996). Similarly highlighting the collaborative and interpersonal nature of morality the cultural 
theorist Judith Butler argues that humans’ lack of a unified executive self is not a hindrance to, but 
the grounding for responsibility: “my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of 
my ethical connection with others” (2001). Conversely, the individualist morality that Butler 
critiques, by cutting off the subject from the world, destroys the basis for its moral engagement 
with it (2005). Social responsibility arises from interrelationality rather than a unified self. Yet 
Butler’s argument remains focused on sociocultural and linguistic structures, where it might be 
better argued that biological, sociocultural and technological factors all contribute to human 
ethical dispositions and practices. The construction of complex moral agents will need to fully take 
into account the distributed nature of human morality and will require functional equivalents of the 
material factors. More complex moral agents will benefit from humanlike appearance and 
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movements, due to our tendency to assume that such agents have higher cognitive and moral 
capacities (Farah and Heberlein, 2007; Krach et al., 2008), but these may be created through 
different matter and means, and more generally while a body is required it is not necessarily a 
body “just like ours” (Clark 2008a).  
In sum, the points discussed indicate that a hybrid approach aimed at achieving a reflective 
equilibrium that incorporates and integrates both top-down rules and bottom-up learning, 
developmental and evolutionary mechanisms will be necessary in artificial moral agents that aim 
at full and flexible moral agency with the built in capacity for forging ethical connections through 
other beings and robots. Meanwhile more basic moral agents will need to have at least what 
Wallach and Allen have called “functional morality”, that is designers and users that consider the 
ethical values being implemented in and through robots, since ethical values are created in robots 
and designed systems whether or not the engineer explicitly constructs them; therefore at the 
bottom level awareness of this needs to be raised (2009).  
 
From Neuroscience and Neuroethics to Robotics and Roboethics 
 
 “What we make” and “what (we think) we are” coevolve together; emergence can operate 
as an ethical dynamic as well as a technological one. (Hayles, 2005).  
 
A claim that the things made by us are intimately related to what we make of ourselves would 
appear to err by confusing the producer with the product. Humans, understood as conscious and 
rational agents, are in opposition to objects, understood as without reason, will or consciousness. 
In the liberal humanist model the role that objects play is as passive matter without our reasoning 
capacities; as puppets moved by our commands; and, at most, as the external result of internal 
mental cogitations. The most recent challenges to this model of the human subject as autonomous 
intellect have been prompted by discoveries in neuroscientific research which, in combination with 
theoretical developments in cognitive science, have revealed the subject to be fundamentally 
shaped by its interactions, tools and creations, as well as the shaper of them. It is increasingly 
being demonstrated that the neurobiological mechanisms which participate in our concepts of the 
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mind and of the subject, rather than acting just as a limitation on hybridity and extendability, in 
fact have a plasticity and interrelationality that invites dynamic and intimate relationships with the 
world (Berti and Frassinetti, 2000; Clark, 2003; Gallese et al., 2004; Maravati and Iriki, 2004; Noë, 
2004). The field of neuroscience over the last two decades has been instrumental in making 
apparent how much of human cognition takes place through loops out into the body, technologies, 
other subjects and the environment.  
 Although diversity of opinion and fertile metaphors abound about exactly how the brain 
works, the general idea followed by artificial architectures involves interlinked activations of a 
mass of parallel processing units that are distributed across the brain. Patterns of neural activity are 
generated in response to excitatory or inhibitory inputs, caused by the synapses’ modulating 
effects, and this activity in turn modifies the synapses themselves. It has become accepted 
knowledge and a motivating force in neuroscientific research that experiences modify not only the 
activity but also the organization of neural circuitry: “One of the most important and fascinating 
properties of the mammalian brain is its plasticity; the capacity of the neural activity generated by 
an experience to modify neural circuit function and thereby modify subsequent thoughts, feelings 
and behaviour” (Citri and Malenka, 2008). Such evidence of neural plasticity suggests that the 
brain is poised to be shaped by, as well as the shaper of, technologies and the surrounding 
environment.   
 Another potential contribution of neuroscience to the study of ethics is to provide 
quantitative, more objective procedures that can aid in assessing the relation of brain functions 
associated with certain mental states and with “personhood” to ethical concerns. Personhood is a 
foundational concept in ethics yet neither psychological traits nor neuroscientific evidence is 
sufficient to define what it is in itself. We cannot explain through quantitative evidence why we 
define that a given agent has personhood, even although brain mechanisms cause us to intuitively 
assess and ascribe a given agent with personhood. Whilst attempts to use brain function alone may 
seem to potentially entail a reductionism of personhood, neuroscientific tests in fact have even 
more surprisingly provided evidence of the illusory nature of this concept (Farah and Heberlein, 
2007). Due to this, neuroscience can also be a useful tool to explain the “uncanny valley” 
hypothesis, first described by the Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori (1970), as it is non-conscious 
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human brain functions that lead to the projection of “personhood” on androids, humanoid robots or 
equivalent agents. This leads to expectations of high cognitive functioning, with these entities’ 
current failure to satisfactorily achieve this then leading to a sense of uncanniness in the human 
spectator (Krach et al., 2008). In any case, even although neuroscience can give us some measures 
to test whether the given object is recognized as a person, rather than leading to a definition of 
personhood per se, it instead arguably makes the case for the consideration of other measures of 
accountability.   
Neil Levy in his introduction to the first issue of Neuroethics also discusses ways in which 
neuroscience is placing in question traditional assumptions about human rationality, autonomy and 
morality (2008; see also Fukushi et al., 2007). What constitutes “humanity” is constantly laid open 
to question by our tendency towards hybridity and relationality, and this tendency is contributed to 
by the input of neurobiological mechanisms. The research of Rizzolatti and his colleagues has led 
to the astonishing discovery of a brain system which further demonstrates that our cognitive 
processes are not exclusively centred within a container subject: “Mirror neurons represent the 
neural basis of a mechanism that creates a direct link between the sender of a message and its 
receiver” (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; see also Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008). Meanwhile 
the work of Antonio Damasio and his colleagues has further established the role of body states and 
emotions in reasoning and social inference, and the role of non-conscious processes in conscious 
decision making (1994). Nor is it just humans who are capable of such fluidity concerning 
physical and identity structures: J. Scott Turner has shown in his ecological research that even 
basic life forms commonly use social and environmental offloading and he contends that “animal-
built structures are properly considered organs of physiology” (2000). 
Yet while mirror neurons provide evidence of a vehicle that biologically extends human 
subjects (based on the Rizzolatti’s view), the mental state does not remain identical across first and 
third person boundaries without the intervening factor of shared first-person experience (Calvo-
Merino et al., 2005). More general neuroscientific studies suggest that specific enactive subjective 
experience frames future experience. Agloti and his colleagues’ study on action anticipation and 
motor resonance in trained basketball players demonstrated that “the fine-tuning of specific 
anticipatory ‘resonance’ mechanisms” endow elite athletes’ brains “with the ability to predict 
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others’ actions ahead of their realization” (2008). Thus, while mirror neurons indicate the potential 
for considerable sharing of various types of experience across persons, this evidence suggests that 
there is also considerable particularity of subjective experience, and that enactive cognition plays a 
significant role in forming our cognitive repertoire and mirroring potential.  
Our subjective experiences of the world are made up of a rich and dynamic mix of shared 
consistencies and particular divergences. Iacobini posits that the recent discovery of “super mirror 
neurons” which play a modulating role in mirror neuron activity by inhibiting overt copying, is 
one of the mechanisms which allow the distinction between self and other to emerge (Iacoboni, 
2008). On similar lines, at “Involving Interface” Ikegami made the vital point that intimate 
interfacing involves attachment and detachment simultaneously, and in discussing the implications 
of current research on mirror neurons for Artificial General Intelligence emphasized their 
revealing the importance of social empathy, co-creativity and collaborative behaviour. These 
abilities are a vital part of the basis of ethical systems.  
An architectural basis of affective states and processes, such as is being developed in the 
reactive mechanisms of Sloman and Chrisley’s model CogAff, would be necessary in a 
sophisticated artificial moral agent (Sloman et al., 2005). So would sophisticated mechanisms for 
sharing across and distinguishing first and third person perspectives, some of the basics of which 
appear to be emerging through the work of Scasselatti and Breazeal, respectively working on Nico, 
a robot who can distinguish between his mirror-image and another’s, and on Leonardo, a robot 
who has been trained to distinguish between his own and other’s beliefs, which has important 
implications for forming moral judgments. Both Breazeal and Turkle also work on, and emphasize 
the implications of, robots’ emotional and social skills, as well as the effects of human projection 
on social interactions with robots (Breazeal, 2002; Turkle, 2004; Turkle et al., 2006). Based on the 
above discussion, we would emphasize that despite the need to acknowledge the limitations of 
neuroscience, it will certainly be of great importance for developing robots, for testing attitudes to 
robots and for modeling and testing models of cognition and moral capacities; with 
interdisciplinary relations advantageous to both neuroscientific and engineering disciplines. 
 Ishiguro’s laboratory works not only on the development of his famous Geminoid and other 
androids, but also develops small interactive humanoids and general sensory mechanisms such as 
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skin sensors, omnidirectional cameras, actuators and sensor networks, and uses neuroscientific 
tests and eye-tracking for assessing the perceived naturalness of robots’ movements. Robots in 
Ishiguro’s lab have access to information that humans may not through a series of strategically 
placed cameras which map social interactions. Particular robotic abilities, as well as lacks, will be 
fundamental to designing their ethical systems. Although as a base point non-harming may 
generally be a prerequisite embedded deeply into the system, the building of robotic soldiers 
designed to kill humans again reflects the diversity at work, as well as reflecting the challenges for, 
and current deficiencies of, human moral reasoning. The variety of robots currently being 
produced and intended for a multiplicity of domains and functions, from the robot soldiers to deep 
sea and space exploration to those being developed as toys, vacuum cleaners and service robots, 
suggests that while robots intended for forms of social interactions in the dynamic and ever-
changing world of human relations, environments and customs will need to be capable of 
emotional understanding, social cognition and collaborative behaviour, more basic forms or forms 
not intended for these purposes need not have these skills.  
The evidence that the cognitive economy, rather than consisting only of language and 
information processes, also involves and evolves through interactions between the brain, the body, 
and the world, are being incorporated into the field of robotics. There is an increasing emphasis on 
developmental relationships and ecological control, in which features of the world or semi-
autonomous components are employed to offset the need for micro-management and central 
control systems (MacDorman and Cowley, 2006; Clark, 2007). The distribution and offloading of 
cognitive processes in a “subsumption architecture” that uses the world as its model, should also 
include consideration of how these processes could involve ethical systems that are extended 
(Brooks, 2002).  
Floridi and Sanders have proposed a potential step forward for roboethics in terms of 
rethinking the legal concepts applied. They suggest using the concept of “moral accountability”, 
rather than that of responsibility, in order to sidestep issues of whether robots have person-like 
capacities of agency. The focus on the responsibility of individual human-like agents has, they 
suggest, obstructed recognition of the extent to which “distributed morality” is already in 
operation: “a macroscopic and growing phenomenon of global moral actions and collective 
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responsibilities resulting from…systemic interactions among several agents at a local level” 
(2004). As neuroethics is considering questions of what levels of observation are appropriate for 
deciding legal questions of accountability, roboethics and the legal system itself will also face 
these issues in relation to robotic systems and the increasingly non-trivial causal spread of 
accountability; both of accountability in itself and in the way we need to come to understand it. 
 
 Overcoming anxiety: interdisciplinary relations & public communication 
 
Our responsibility begins with the power to imagine...Turn this on its head and you could 
say that where there’s no power to imagine, no responsibility can arise. (Murakami, 2005) 
 
The authors also wish to draw attention to potential contributions from the history of ideas, since 
philosophical, historical and literary disciplines all have relevance for the construction of ethical 
approaches, both in relation to the field of robotics and to our fundamentally and increasingly 
hybrid human forms. Wider spectrum approaches could achieve improved ethical standpoints. The 
opening of disciplinary doors invites insight into the epistemological assumptions and structures 
within which we work (our disciplinary “bodies”) and can invite less specialized dialogue that is 
therefore more accessible to public understanding generally. If granted that human subjects’ 
ethical disposition lies in part in their interrelationality, then less closed systems and more 
interactions between disciplines are potentially advantageous. Besides, peer review systems 
involve restricted networks of established participants, which do not necessarily invite differing 
views from those which are the established or favored norms. This is another reason that it is 
important for researchers to keep channels of dialogue open between disciplines and towards the 
wider public. Furthermore, issues about the accountability of research relate to broader questions 
of accountability, in that both disciplines and individuals need to be able to acknowledge their own 
areas of opacity and inconsistency to the extent that these are cognizable and communicable, 
rather than eliding them, and to be aware of the already necessarily existing connections both 
between individual and disciplines. 
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 At “Involving Interface” Tadashi Kobayashi warned of the way in which problems with 
inflated reporting of research (due to bidding for grants) leads to a crisis of public confidence in 
science; this fuelling of fears by researchers’ exaggerated accounts being then further fuelled by 
increasingly ungrounded media reporting. The authors suggest that humans’ ongoing fear and 
fascination with technology is also fundamentally due to awareness of our reliance on it. This fear 
and fascination for present purposes specifically tends to manifest in concerns about the types of 
robots, technological and biological systems that may be created. While the particular innovations 
and advances are new they often relate to issues that are familiar from the past, since while we are 
increasingly discovering revolutionary new ways to extend and transform the biological structure 
itself, the mind and the subject have always involved extensions into and transformations by the 
world in which they exist.  
Within fictional as well as academic accounts the need to balance the drive to tell a coherent 
story and the true complexity and richness of detail is an underlying issue. Isaac Asimov, Philip K. 
Dick, Bernard Wolfe, Richard Powers, Ian McEwan: these are but a few of the writers whose 
fictional works have in recent decades explored the ethical implications of current and speculated 
future technological and scientific advances. Hideaki Sena, who combined his own scientific and 
literary interests in the novel Parasite Eve, emphasizes the continuing reciprocity of relations 
between scientists and novelists, and specifically discussing this in relation to the Japanese context 
he stresses: “We may be able to gain a realistic view of the environment for robots in Japan by 
thinking of robot stories as interfaces between culture and science. Images are being passed back 
and forth between fiction and real-life science, and these two realms are closely interconnected” 
(2003). Fictional representations of technological hybrids and futuristic scenarios playfully expose 
and explore the types of fear and fascination aroused by the capacities of robots, cyborgs and 
human prostheses. Literature’s significance is again recognized in Richard Gregory’s statement 
that: “fiction is the look-ahead of Mind that has created the Science in which we find ourselves” 
(1981). 
A final response to fears that once robots eventually develop beyond human capabilities and 
become able to reprogram themselves, it may not be in a robot’s own perceived interests to 
safeguard human interests, comes not from optimists who trust that human friendly attitudes will 
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survive. Donna Haraway argues that the aim should be to consider both the positive and negative 
aspects of the possible outcome of our technological developments: “The political struggle is to 
see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities 
unimaginable from the other vantage point” (1991). Double or even the multiple perspectives 
provided by diverse art forms and disciplinary bodies are needed.  
Yet, there is room for a different type of hopefulness. Our response is motivated by the 
belief that at such a time of robotic sophistication human cognitive and ethical capabilities would 
therefore also be likely to outstrip our current forms. Neuroscientific evidence suggests how 
intimate our interfaces with robots or forms of technological prostheses could be and neural 
constructivism depicts experience as productive of new neural growth. Clark highlights the 
significance of this plasticity: “This symbiosis of brain and cognitive technology, repeated again 
and again but with new technology sculpting new brains in different ways, may be the origin of a 
golden loop, a virtuous spiral of brain/culture influence that allows human minds to go where no 
animal minds have gone before” (2001). By these mechanisms human and robotic ethical 
capabilities could evolve into forms extended beyond the limits of our current imaginations: 
“Human intelligence is very largely Artificial Intelligence, and even our hopes and fears (and our 
moral commitments, for they are set by possibilities of achievement) are largely set by existing 
technology” (Gregory, 1981).  
 
Conclusion 
 
An extended mind approach acknowledges the role of both scientific and sociocultural categories 
within the ethical context. While certain scientific categories such as genes may be classed as pre-
existing, they are like their social counterparts nevertheless subject to the history and evolution not 
only of the individual, the species, and the world, but also of the terminologies and frameworks 
used to describe them. Scientific and sociocultural categories are both representative of the world 
and historical. This hybridity suggests that an integrated equilibrium between top-down and 
bottom-up approaches will be necessary in creating complexly capable robotic moral agents. This 
also invites engagement between the arts, sciences and technical disciplines and an 
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acknowledgement of their shared ground as well as their differences: both utilise and interrogate 
accepted conceptual categories, and dare to imagine new forms, terminologies, and frameworks 
for thinking about the mind and being human. In concert, they offer fruitful multiple perspectives 
on these issues.  
 Our descendents, of all materialities, will hopefully be less biologically bound than we are. 
Nevertheless, not only our words but also our bodies make evident the extendability and 
adaptability of humans. The positing of dynamically reciprocal relations between the construction 
of objects and the construction of subjects logically follows through by positing ethical as well as 
technological consequences, and as with Butler but on an even wider basis, we contend that the 
elision of human relationality and materiality, or of our multiplicity and mutability, will not enable 
but instead undermine the emergence of viable human or robotic ethical models. 
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